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THE CARTEL POLICY IN THE CARTEL LAW SPECIAL 




A very specific area of Cartel Law was the Cartel Policy Law, which was in close 
connection to the state’s power to oversee cartels, which meant nothing more or less than 
the protection of economy and public welfare. This procedure included the ordinary fining 
procedures.1
According to the Act XX of 1931, only those could be punished by ordinary fines who 
failed to introduce the Cartel Settlement or the order, and did not provide ample reason for 
this omission, who did not obey the appeal for the examination of the case of the Secretary 
of Economy, all in all, failed to fulfil the duty to provide data, or obstructed the fulfilment 
of the appeal.2 Those who carried out appeals or settlements which they were forbidden to 
do so by the Cartel Court, or manifest behaviour or carry out acts forbidden by the Cartel 
Court are contained within the same framework. 
In the first two cases, the assigned courthouses were required to see the case through, 
which started the procedure according to the request of the legal director of the treasury 
based on the proposal of the secretary. In the third case, the Cartel Court was privy to the 
case, for it could establish a fining ex officio. The Cartel Court was assigned to the case if the 
fine was established repeatedly but unsuccessfully for a second and third time according to 
the motion of the Secretary of Economy, or in another lawsuit of general interest according 
to the motion of the legal director, if they wished to suggest proscription from trade or 
industry permanently, or for a pre-established period of time.3
According to Harasztosi, none of his cases in fining procedures only the lawsuits 
concerning ordinary fines had any actual significance, especially if the presentation of a 
document was forgotten or was filed in late; or in cases filed for omission of compulsory 
data presentation. In cases filed for the failure to oblige presentation duties, the matter 
of penalty fell under the rights of the assigned secretary. The conformations filed to the 
1 Research was supported by the GVH. Harasztosi Király Ferenc: A kartel. Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata, 
Budapest, 1936. 546-547.
2 Lőw Tibor: A gazdasági versenyt szabályozó megállapodások bemutatásáról. Magyar Jogi Szemle, 1935. XVI. 
köt. 350. 
3 Lőw, 1935. 351. Dobrovics Károly: A karteljogi rendbüntetés gyakorlata. Közgazdasági Értesítő, 1934. 
XXIX. 33. sz. 10., Dobrovics Károly: A karteltörvény három évi gyakorlata. – A kartelszerződés érvényességi 
kellékei. Közgazdasági Értesítő, 1935. XXX. 4. sz. 9.
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secretary had no such effect which vindicates the affair, the contestants could not achieve 
more with it than saving themselves from paying the ordinary fine.4
In fining procedures started at courts of justice, the court had to used the rules in in 
cases of trade delinquencies. This order of 68,400/1914. I. M. had to be taken into account.5
In a case of ordinary fining procedures, no imprisonment could be ordered as a main 
rule, for the fine levied due to the failure to present a document could be transformed into 
custodial sentences. There were specific cases where the fine could not be collected, but 
even then the Act had to specifically allow this transformation.6 
The legal director asked for the actuation of the procedure, and presented the Mihály 
Schwarz, Mihály Menzer and Ignácz Ádler, timber merchants from Kiskunhalas, made an 
agreement in 1933 according to Pharagraph No. 1 of the Cartel Procedural Law concerning 
timber, terracotta bricks and pottery products. They introduced the cartel contract to the 
Secretary of Trade on the 12th April, 1933, however, the list of pre-determined prices, 
which should have been one of the appendices of the contract, was only presented on the 
4th May, 1933. In this case, the participants were late, and didn’t even provide a justification 
for this. According to this, the Secretary of Trade ordered the legal directorate to actuate 
a case due to the failure to present a document. According to decree No. 68400/1914. I. 
M., the legal directorate asked the Royal Court of Kalocsa to actuate a case against the 
aforementioned companies.7
The fining procedures was heard out by one of the orderly judges of the court of justice, 
who, as the presenter of the case and put the examination and trial aside to direct the attention 
of the complainants that the justifying statement had to be presented within 15 days after 
the appeal to do so was received. After this, the court decided on the appropriate penalty 
or the annulment of the case by takin the presented documents and the officially imparted 
information. The warrant established during the closed hearing was delivered to both the 
complainants and the royal legal directorate. According to this, the aforementioned decree 
presented role of public accuser to the royal prosecutor, but based on legal practices, this 
position was fulfilled the legal director in such cases.8 
In the aforementioned lawsuit actuated by the Court of Kalocsa, the participants were 
asked to provide a document in proof.9 According to this, the complainants provided the 
document in proof, with which they wished to verify that they did not fail their duty to 
present documents, established in the Act.10 According to their document of proof, their 
opinion is that there’re wasn’t no sin of omission, for they didn’t establish the appendix 
of the contract when they signed the contract, and after it was signed, they introduced it 
to the Secretary for inspection within the deadline.11
4 Harasztosi, 1936. 548., Lőw, 1935. 352.
5 1931:XX. tc. 15. §.
6 See: Act X of 1928 article 16.
7 Cg. 187/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c. See: P. VI. 9489/16/1934 BFL, 13. P. 46341/3/1933. In: 2746/1934 BFL, 
Cg. 35030/9. sz. In: 1158/1934 BFL., Cg. 33989/6/1932 In: 920/1933 BFL., Cg. 34592/4. sz. In: 4913/1933 
BFL.
8 Harasztosi, 1936. 549.
9 Cg. 187/3/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c. See: 13. P. 46341/3/1933. In: 2746/1934 BFL
10 Cg. 187/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c.
11 Cg. 187/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c. See: Cg. 187/4/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c., Cg. 35030/9. sz. In: 1158/1934 
BFL., Dobrovics, 1934. 14.
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Within 8 days after the delivery, they could turn to the assigned High Court against 
the decision. This affected the decision by having a postponing effect. Any individual who 
was thwarted in validating his or her individual rights in a lawsuit of the first or second 
degree, could file a document of proof. However, one could not file a document of proof 
because of an omission, the application f or the document of proof had to be filed for the 
court of justice within 30 days of the established day of the trial or the expiration date of 
the failed legal remedy.12
The formulaic rules of the application was under the effect of Paragraphs 464-466 of 
the Criminal Code of Procedure. It had to be filed at the courthouse where the complainant 
failed to keep to the deadline. This application had to contain the reason for the delay and 
the justification information and data, with the evidences that the court needed also had to 
be enclosed. If the matter was of the omission of an act of legal remedy, then the appointed 
court of the first degree turned the application over to the assigned higher court. In cases 
where the court made place for the document of proof, than, at the same time, also acted 
for the substitution of the omitted documents. The Court of Appeal had the power to come 
to an absolute decision in the case.13
In the lawsuit filed against the companies Nagykovácsi Lime Factory Corporation and 
the Lime and Grout Sales Corporation, the complainants presented in their document of 
proof that the debated agreement was not made on the 20th March, 1933, for on this date, 
they only signed the draft of the contract. The court did not accept the statement presented 
in the document, and fined the complainants for breaking Paragraph No. 14 of the Cartel 
Procedural Law.14
To find out the bearings of a case, the court could order an examination, if deemed 
necessary. In this case, the court selected an investigator from its own apparatus of judges 
or notaries. The duty of the investigator was to describe the bearings of the case, and based 
on this, the court of justice could order the termination or the continuation of said legal 
action. In order to do so, the investigator interrogated the complainant, and acquired all 
documents and evidences necessary to clarify the bearings of the case.15
The rules of Bp. were deemed valid during the interrogation of witnesses and experts.16 
The court or the investigator could absolve any business associate from clarifying any 
circumstance which was not deemed vital to the examination or the case, yet would result 
in business secrets that are not necessary for the trial to come to light. If the investigator 
deemed it necessary, he could ask for a court order for an audit. This procedure was only 
valid if it was deemed necessary to ascertain the omission or act under investigation. If 
the procedural step could only be fulfilled by the means of writ, it was necessary to turn 
to the assigned County Court. The court of justice could order the investigator to continue 
or terminate the investigation.17
12 Harasztosi, 1936. 549.
13 Ibid. 549.
14 Cg. 35537/3. In: 5812/1934. BFL. Lőw, 1935. 354. Dobrovics Károly: A karteltörvény három évi gyakorlata. 
Közgazdasági Értesítő, 1935. XXX. 3. sz. 12., Dobrovics Károly: Bírói gyakorlat kartelügyekben. Közgazdasági 
Értesítő, 1934. XXIX. 47. sz. 13.
15 Harasztosi, 1936. 550.
16 Cg. 35030/9. sz. In: 1158/1934 BFL. Dobrovics, 1934. 15.
17 Harasztosi, 1936. 550.
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To uphold common welfare, the legal directorate could oversee the inspection, and 
because of this, it could examine the investigation documents, and could file a proposal to the 
investigator to continue or terminate the investigation, or could file a proposal to the court of 
justice to debate the investigator’s regulations. The latter two was within the complainant’s 
rights, as well, who could select a defence attorney even during the investigation, whose 
rights were also determined by the Bp. The defence attorney could only be one of the 
practicing legal experts, one who was registered at one of the Bar Associations.18
The complainant had no right to intervene or propose during the examination or the 
rest of the procedure, could not form a statement or get legal remedy. However, he or she 
was free to introduce any circumstance to the investigator, the court of justice or Court 
of Appeal which could move the examination of the omission or illegal activity forward 
or assists the verification. If he was not selected to appear as witness, he could press for 
this, and the court of justice and the Court of Appeal was obliged to enact this, with the 
added burden of nullifying.
After the examination was finished, the investigator sent the documents to the court of 
justice. Based on these documents, the court could order the termination or the continuation 
of the legal action. The court stated the termination of a legal procedure in a warrant. In any 
other case, a term had to be set in order to continue the case orally. In cases when the act 
or malpractice fell under the effect of criminal law, the legal action had to be transferred 
to a Criminal Court.19
A case was filed against the Chinoin Pharmaceutical and Chemical Factory Corporation 
for breaking Paragraphs No. 2 and 14 of the Cartel Procedural Law, and thus committing 
cartel malpractice, and it took place at the court of justice of Budapest, where the court 
of the second degree reached a warrant, specified as No. 35779/2, but was turned to a 
higher court by the legal directorate, yet it was rejected by the Court of Appeal, and in 
their warrant, they pointed out Paragraph No. 1 of the 5th Act of 1878, according to which 
an act can only be considered a crime or a delinquency if the Act considers it as such.20 In 
such cases, Criminal Courts should proceed.
The court could order the legal action to move forward, if the bearings of the case were 
clear. Before this, the complainant was asked to make a statement with a 15-day deadline.21
In the warrant ordaining the trial, the act or malpractice encumbering the complainant 
had to be stated, with the exact place of a specific provision under the law. 
At the same time, the court of law was assigned with the task to provide a warrant to 
appear to all contestants, witnesses, and experts. They could issue a warrant to appear for 
even those participants who were announced after the beginning of the trial by any of the 
contestants. The complainant had to be warned that if he or she chooses not to appear, this 
non-attendance does not obstruct the continuation and discussion of the case, he was free 
to hire a legal representative and take place in the case.22 The arrival of the subpoena and 
the beginning of the trial had to be at least 15 days apart. During trials, if the complainant 
was a natural person, he or she could not be apprehended, committed into custody or put 
18 Ibid. 551.
19 Ibid. 551.
20 P. VI. 8146/4/1934. BFL.
21 Harasztosi, 1936. 551.
22 Cg. 187/2/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c.
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in detention awaiting trial. This was a significant difference between this and a criminal 
legal action.23
The beginning of the trial was marked by reading out the warrant which ordained it, and 
after that, the judge summarized the case. The trial could be held even if the contestants 
failed to appear. The witnesses and experts could be ordered to step forward, and, in order 
to do so, the trial could be interrupted for a few hours.
After this, the president could interrogate the present complainant in connection to 
the act or malpractice, and the members of the judicial board, the president of the legal 
department and the defence attorney could ask their questions.24 After these, verification 
was recorded.
After verification was finished, the president of the legal department introduced his 
proposal to the court, followed by the defence attorney and, finally, the complainant. There 
was no place for any other discussion in this section of the legal action. In cases where the 
contestants failed to appear, the judge introduced and described the evidence.25
The publicity of the trial was under the rules written down in Bp. The court could order 
the exclusion of the public in order to preserve business secrets. The rules written down in 
Bp. were also valid in connection to the development of the trial and maintaining order.26
During the fining procedure filed against the Textile Factory of Győr Corporation, the 
Textile Industry of Soroksár Corporation, and Mózes Freudinger and Sons corporation, 
the royal court of Budapest considered the minutes of the 18th February, 1931 as evidence, 
and according to this, they determined that the complainants were present on the general 
assembly on the raw material agreement, and these individuals “report their inclusion to 
the raw material agreement, since up to that point, their inclusion was based on gentlemen’s 
agreement”.27 The court considered this unwritten gentlemen’s agreement to fall under Act 
No. 1 of the Cartel Procedural Law.
The court judged the circular letter on the same merit, when it stated that it is a regulation 
in itself that should have been presented to the Secretary of Trade, “for it obviously serves 
the purpose that the individuals who wrote it down and signed it could sell their merchandise 
on a higher price, and this, limit the economic competition in connection to the formation 
of prices”.28
The court considered the fact that the agreement formed by Rezső Vágó Corporation 
and the Hungarian Timber Corporation was not presented to the court in time for it only 
fell under the effect of Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel Procedural Law after the P. IV. 
5261/1932 verdict of the Cartel Court as an extenuating circumstance. The court stated that 
“the decrees of the Cartel Procedural Law are not only valid for cartel contracts, but also 
establish the duty to present any sort of agreement which, in connection to merchandise, 
establishes any sort of limitation or regulation duty to the economic competition, both in 
23 Harasztosi, 1936. 551.
24 Ibid. 552.
25 Ibid. 552.
26 Lőw, 1935. 354.
27 Cg. 35504/6. sz. In: 4681/1934 BFL.
28 Cg. 33989/6/1932 In: 920/1933 BFL.
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the matters of circulation or price formation, so, even a delivery contract can fall under 
the regulations of Act No. 20 of 193129
After the trial was finished, the court of justice could either terminate the proceedings or 
could determine that the complainant was guilty and described the appropriate punishment 
in its warrant. In both cases, the order needed reasoning. The proposal of the legal director 
did not bind the court in any way. The fine had to be executed with a 15-day deadline.30
The legal director established a similar procedure against the Sándor Angyalfi Asphalt 
and Tar Industry Corporation, János Biehn, Grozit Asphalt and Tar Chemical Products 
Corporation, Tivadar Helvey, DSc, Manó Kallós Ferenc Kollár and Co. Hungarian Asphalt 
Corporation, Posnánszky and Strelitz and Hungarian Cover Panel Factory purchaser and 
sales cooperative due to cartel elision31 The royal court of Budapest stated in its warrant that 
the complainants are guilty, for the agreement which elongated the contract that expired on 
the 28th February, 1934, was only presented after the deadline, so, belatedly.32 The court 
stated that “according to Paragraph No. 2 of the 20th Act of 1931, any agreement which 
modifies or regulates the economic competition, modifies and elongates he original, or any 
necessarily written agreement that falls under Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel Procedural Law 
should be presented within 15 days after the establishment of the agreement. According 
to this mandate, it is not enough to just report the agreement, but a written form of the 
agreement had to be filed for the Royal Secretary of Trade of Hungary for registration.”33
In another case, the court of justice of Budapest terminated the procedure against the 
complainants, for it turned out that the agreement was presented before the deadline, since 
the court established that the formation of a cartel agreement is, by definition, the moment 
when every participant signed the contract.34
To sum it all up, according to the sources available in archives, most cartel cases were 
judicial proceedings. It can be stated that the special nature of the rules of these proceedings 
were unique in the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedures, for the civil courthouses made 
their decisions in a case of civil law by using the rules of the Code of Criminal Action.
29 Cg. 34592/4 In: 4913/1933 BFL. Lőw, 1935. 355
30 Harasztosi, 1936. 552. See: 13. P. 46341/3/1933. In: 2746/1934 BFL, Lőw, 1935. 353.
31 Cg. 35891/3. sz. BFL. 11543/1934
32 Cg. 35891/3. sz. BFL. 11543/1934
33 Cg. 35891/3. sz. BFL. 11543/1934, Dobrovics Károly: Karteljogi kérdések. Közgazdasági Értesítő, 1934. 
XXIX. 35. sz. 14.
34 Cg. 35547/12/1934 BFL
